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Inthecourse ofunderstanding a text,asuccessionofdecision
points arise atwhich readers are faced with the task ofchoosing
among alternative possible interpretations ofthattext. We
present new experimental evidence thatdifferent readers use
different inference strategies toguide theirinference behavior
during understanding. The choices available to an understander
range from various alternative inferential paths to the option of
making no inference ataparticularpoint, leaving aloose end'.
Different inference strategies resultinobservablydifferent
behaviors during understanding, includingconsistent differences
inreading times, anddifferent interpretations ofa text The
preliminary experimental results given here so far consistently
supporta previously published setofhypotheses aboutthe
inference process thatwe have calledJudgmental Inference theory.
1,0 Introduction
When tryingtoionderstand even a simple text, readers make
complex evalnations ofthe texttohelp choose oneofseveral
alternative interpretations. Inmaking such decisions, readers
employ anumber ofdifferent strategies, including the selection of
an inference path. This paper presents a theory ofhow readers
makesuchchoices. Forexample, subjects inour experiments read
the following story:
[1] Melissa began to cry. Tyler had justasked herto marry him.
When askedwhyMelissa begantocry,differentsubjects gaveat
least two significantly different answers; (1) because shewasupset
for some reason about Tyler's proposal,perhaps becauseshe
couldn'tor didn't want to acceptthe proposal;vs. (2)becauseshe
was sohappy about theproposal that shewascrying tearsofjoy.
Preliminary findings inaseriesofcontrolled experiments indicate
that
1. the answers a subjectgivesto this and similar questions
correlate with different reading times;
2. these differences in reading times, and the differences in
question-answering behavior, andthecorrelation between
them,areall accurately predicted onthebasisofhypothesized
'inference strategies' containedinJudgmental Inference
theory [Granger 1982];
3. the different readingtimesandinterpretationsare notdueto
arbitraryindividual differences, butrather totheadoption by
Thisresearchwassupported in part bythe NationalScience
Foundation undergrantlST-Sl-206S5 andbytheNaval Ocean
SystemsCenterundercontractNOO123-8 l-C-1078.
individuals ofsome particular principled inference strategy,
as evidenced by the fact that individuals ^tially exhibiting
onetypeofstrategy beexperimentally manipulatedto
exhibits differenttype of strategy.
While many theories ofinference inunderstandingacknowledge
the existence ofalternative inferential paths, we present a theory
that (1)catalogs the pathsavailable toan understander, (2)
predicts whatmechanisms willleadtothe choice ofparticular
inferential pathsduringunderstanding,and (3)provides
preliminary experimental evidencewhichsupports these
hypotheses.
2.0 Background
Language understanding isan interactive process which requires
bothadequateinformation presentation on the part ofthe
communicator and skills ofinterpretation on the part ofan
understander. The interpretation skills necessary for
understandingincludemechanismsforsuch inferencetasks as
associating referents(Anderson Sc Bower,1973;Ka\"ilar.d &
Clarke, 1974),recognizingtemporally or causally related events
(Schank &Abelson, 1977; Bower, Black,&Turner, 1979; Blackand
Bern,1980), andfilling in unstated actions and preconditions for
actionsina stereotypicalsequenceofevents (Schank, 1973,1977;
Bower et. aL, 1979).
For example, consider the following story;
[2] Call had accidentally poured coffee onto Will's hand. He
screamed bloody murder.
Readers have no trouble inferring that **he" in the second sentence
refers to Will from the first sentence. This is known as referential
cohesion. Readers also recognize that Will screamed after the
coffee waspoured onhim,although nospecifictemporalconnection
was stated. Further, readers will only infer that WiU screamed
becausehewas in painor because hewas very angry with GaU(or
both). They willnot inferthat hescreamed becausehesawa ghost,
or because he suddenly remembered it was time for his primal
scream therapy. Thisconnectionbetween the twoevents is known
as causal cohesion (ScHanE, 1977). Causal cohesion has been
demonstrated extensively through various experiments (Anderson
et al, 1973; deVilliers,1974;Boweret al, 1979;Blacket al, 1980),
which indicate that recaU of story events was higher and reading
time was faster if the events in the story were causally related.
These studies demonstrate the integral role inferences play in
understanding text.
It is importanttonotethat understanders make inferences about
text as they read, not after they have finished reading. Referential
inferences have been demonstrated to be made during reading.
Seifert, Robertson, and Black (1982)discuss Haviland and Clark's
1974 experiments whichshow that reading times are longe.' v.
statements cannot be easily connected through referents. Seifert
et. al. also point out thatiafcrences which do not rely on linguistic
contestare madebythe reader. These pragmatic inferences
involve causal connections formed between statements inthetest
and world knowledge which areader draws upon toinfer causality,
case relations, missing events inastereotypical sequence ofevents,
andotherabstract inferences. ForillustraUon, recaU story[2], Attheend ofthefirstsentence aninference isma^e that the
subsequent events will be related tothe coffee spilling. This is
easily illustrated by giving adifferentversion ofthestory to
readers:
t2a] Gail had accidentally poured coffee onto Will's hand. He
told her a silly joke.
Readerswouldbe confused by this versionbecausethere isno
apparent causal connection. They would try to relate the events in
any way possible; for example, they might decide thatWill told thejoke to Gail before she poured the coffee, and that she found thejoke so funny thatshe got careless with her coffee pouring. A
reader might also decide that telling jokes was Will's stoic response
to pain, or thatthe coffee wasn't hot. Most readers will eventually
conclude that the eventswerenotcausallyrelatedat all. Whatis
intruiging isthatany original expectations about events which a
reader generates after readmg the first sentence will be different
from interpretations possible after reading thesecond sentence.
Theremustbe at least twopointsduringthe readingat which
inferences abouteventscanbemade, forinstance, one alter the
first sentence, and oneafter the second. Suchpoints are known as
inference points(seeRumelhart, 1981).
Several options areavailable tothereader ataninference point.
The reader mayieave a loose end(Granger, 1980a, 1981); that is,
no particular inference about further events isgenerated. The
readeroften comes upwithdefaultinferences, which, giventhe
material already read,are the mostlikelyofthe possible events,
reactions,and soon. In story l2],someofthe default inferences
wouldbe that the coxiee had scalded ill,* that he w*as in pain,and
that he might reactto thepain. The reader can also make another
kind ofinference whichwouldnot be based onthe most likely
outcome ofthe story based onthe events sofar. For example,in
story [2], a plausible inference isthatWill may decide totake
revenge on Gail, orthatWill screamed before Gail spilled the
coffee,and shespilled the coffee because thescream startled her.
Inttiitively, the default inference abouttemporal relations isthat
events are described in the order in whichthey happened.
Likewise, the mostfrequentdefaultinference aboutcausal
relations is that earlier events caused subsequent events to
happen.
However, it is not alwaysthe casethat the orderin whichevents
are relayed in text is theorderinwhich the readerinfersthem to
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have happened. It onlyappears t-hisway becausetests are o!ien
wTitten in a problem-'solution fasr.i'.on, rather t.".a.n an
action/explanation fashion. Ther'e are many texts that donot
make it immediauly clear whethrer or not events have been relayed
in cause/effect order. When this fcappens, different strategies may
arrive at different interpretatioos ofthe order.
The inferences that are made conform to evaluation metrics
(Granger, 1980a)which determine how appropriatethe inference
is. Cohesion, in itsvarious forms, isonesuchevaluation metric.
Anothermetric isparsimony(Granger, ISSOa, 1980b). Parsimony
refers to the observation that reaiaers will infer the least
complicated explanation ofevents possible. Forexample:
[31 Maty picked upa magazime. Sheswatted a fly.
In the above ^ry, readerswillalhways inferthat Marypicked up
themagazine inorder toswatthe fly, eventhough severalother
interpretations arepossible (for example, that she picked upthe
magazine toread, thenwasannoyed bythefly andused the
magazine to swatit. ReaderswiHagreethat thesemore
complicated interpretations areerquaUy possible interpretations.
Buteven though theseinterpreta-tions are all equallylogically _
possible, people universally choose themostparsimonious ofthe
interpretations --i-e^ the onethartwillexplain most
parsimoniously themaximum nunnber ofevents in the text.
Ifthe reader left a looseend afterreading the first sentence in the
story above, asinfigure la, therewould beno problem relating the
twosentenceswiththe most parsiimonious inference. However, if
the reader makes the default inference that Mary wanted to read
the magazine, asin figure lb, the- reader mustsupplant that initial
inference with the new inference 'that the magazine was going to ce
used for f.yswatting. Supplanting occurs when adefaultinference
made bya readerdoes notaccouna parsimoniously forallofthe
events in the lest.
Readers are constantly evaluatir:g their own inferences,
supplanting inferences whichare not parsimonious,re
interpretingwhole sections oftesrtwhen the text has a surprise
ending(e.g. mystery stories,jokes),andsoon. Judgmental
Inferencetheory [Granger1982] ihypothesizes that all inference
points areinfact decision points,."where one ofmany pathsis
chosen (e.g. leaving a loose end,making a defaultinference,
supplanting aninference, etc.) ba.sed on complex evaluations ofthe
interpretationbeingconstructed- Theseinterpretations can
involve a series ofintermediate steps, in which many
interpretations aretested. Judgmental inference isnotaconscious
attempt to discover the interpretation that ismostparsimonious,
most logical,or mostcohesive. Raxther, it is an unconsciousprocess,
guided by inference strategies.
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Figure 1
3.0 Theoretical Predictions of Judgmental Inference
J udgmental inference theory makesseveralspecific predictionsof
how peoplechoose 'inference paths'. This paper and the
experimentsdescribed herefocus onthe study ofthese predictions.
In particular,the experiments discussed below focus onthe
following questions:
1. Whenin the interpretation processare inferences made, ifat
all?
2. When in the interpretation processare looseends left,ifat all?
3. Whendo inferences get supplanted, if at all?
4. What happens whena reader doubts an inference?
5. When there are two (or more) equally plausible, parsimonious,
and "normal" interpetations ofstory events possible, which
one will readers select, why will they select it, and whatwill
happenifdoubtaboutthe chosen interpretation is introduced?
It was pointedout abovethat a reader may take oneofseveral
inferencepaths wheninterpreting a story. For example, readers
can leave loose ends or make inferences at inference points.
Readers can read with a "naive" or a "suspicious" understanding;
they can assume that the author is conveyingthe facts or trying to
deceivethem, that actors in the text have overt or covert goals,and
so on. Yet most readers come up with very similar interpretations
ofstoryevents. Either all readers follow the same inferencepaths,
or with enoughconstraints, all inferencepaths will lead to similar
interpretations ofevents. This theory espousesthe latter \iew.
We theorize that interpretations are based on strategies or
systematic choicesbetweeninference paths, and that individuals
tend to use the same inference paths consistently. This would
make possible the discovery ofinference path choices,and explain
whyreaders' interpretations oftext are usuallysimilar, yet diverge
on occasion. However, the inference path system chosen is neither
idiosyncratic nor universal to all readers, instead, there seems to
be a 'scale' ofsystems. We have divided this scale into several
broad categories, although it should be noted that in reality, we
have so far found no clear divisions among them.
Those readers who tend to come up with an interpretation of events
as early as possible in the reading and then cling to that
interpretation as longas possiblecan be described &sPerseuerers.
Those readers who tend to leave loose ends about goals and plans,
(unless the goals or plans are explicitly stated) are known as
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Recencies. Recencies will come up with an interpr?:a-ion fairly
late in the text, and if a conflict develops between p.rssible
interpretations, the interpretation based on the most recent
information is chosen.
There are examples of extreme behavior at both ends of the scale.
The most dedicated of Recencies will not make inferences. Unless a
goal or a plan is explicitly stated, these readers will leave loose
ends. Such behavior should result in quick reading, but slow and
possibly haphazard answering when queried about inferred events.
The extreme version of the Perseverer might be analagous to a
"paranoid" reader. Such readers would make inferences based on
preconceived notions. They might relate text to their own
experiences, or ascrioe attributes to characters which are clearly
not in line with actual text.
Because there is not necessarily a clear division between the two
main categories, there are readers who behave as though they
could belong in either category. Such readers are called De/errers.
It is not clear whether Deferrers are using some combination ofthe
other strategies or a different sort of strategy altogether. Future
experiments may help explain Deferrer behavior.
Recall the following example:
[1] Melissa began to cry. Tyler had just asked herto marry him.
Q: Why did Melissa c^?
As Figure 2a shows, a Perseverer reading this story will believe
that Melissa was upset with Tyler's proposal; maybe she doesn't
like Tyler, or maybe she is unable to get married even though she
loves Tyler. The exact cause is unknown, but the default inference
based on her tears is that she is unhappy. That is, in the absence of
more specific information, crying is assumed to be a visible sign cf
pain or unhappiness, and there is some action which car. explain
unhappiness. Any new information in the story (here, Tyler's
proposal) will be interpreted as an explanation for that
unhappiness or a reaction to the unhappiness.
A Recency would believe just the opposite: that Melissa is happy
with the proposal, and that she is crying tears cf joy, not tears of
sorrow. Figure 2b illustrates the inference strategy of a Recency
trying to understand the events in this story. Recencies do not
make an initial inference about Melissa's crying, not even a default
inference; unless a specific goal or plan is stated, a Recency will
leave a loose end, waiting for more specific information. If later
events in the story are more specific about goals and plans, then
earlier events will be interpreted in light of this more specific
information. Even if no rhore specific information is given, a
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Figure 2
Recency will use the latest events in tthe story to interpret earlier
events. ThiiS. a Recency would raak<2 no inference about thecause
ofMelissa's tears.The laterinformanioa about Tyler's proposal
would give rise to apresumed defau i^nterpretation of "happy
event", andtheearlier events inthestorywould be interpreted as
beingin linewitha happy event,sozhatMelissa s tearsare
assumed to be tears ofjoy.
Ifthis modeliscorrect, reversaloftlhesentencesoftheabove story
should produce theopposite interprastation from thetwo extreme
groups;that is, whenpresentedwiths:
[4] Tyler had just asked Melissa tro marry him. She began to cry.
Recencies shouldinferthat Melissa, is unhappy abouttheproposal,
whilePersaverers shouldinferthas she iscryingtears ofjoy.
4.0 Puzzles Solved
The theory ofinterpretationstrategieshelps answer thequestions
posed earlier. We can explain whem loose ends will be left and
wheninferenceswillbe madeas being dependentupon which
inference paththeindividual chooses. This explanation also
suffices for predicting when inferences will be supplanted. Another
problem thatthis model addresses, isdetermining which of two
equally plausible and parsimohiouis interpretations will be
selected. Along these lines,Schank, et.aL explain such
misunderstanding inverbalcomnrunication by"...maintaining
that deriving apoint isa partofprocessing, specifically related to
the choice of an 'inference path'. C.nderstanders chooseto process
idiosyncratically" (Schank, et.al., 'i.a32,p. 263). This explanation
ofderiving a point agrees withoui" theory ofinference paths.
. However, rather -man believing un.derstanders' processing tobe
idiosyncratic, thismodel predicts chat individuals wUl tend to
follow a single strateg '^* consistentby,rather than arbitrarily
switching from path to path.
Another puzzle ispresented inRumelhart'sdSSl) work. His
subjects had storiespresented eithiera word at a time, a lineat a
time,orall at once. The subjects' imferences werecollected either
• at the endofa lineor at the endoftlhestory. Rumelhartcompared
final interpetations ofsubjects who read thewhole story,and
subjectswho read the story a line a;ta time,and wrote:
The results showed that subjects who interpreted a line at a
time nearly always generated che same interpretations as
thsawhogave usanafter-the-£act interpretation. The only
discemable difference was tfaattthose who gave an
interpretation onlyat the endsdiowed somewhatmore
variability in their interpretacions (p. 27).
Rumelhart's ownexplanationofthiisphenomenon attemptedto
write it offas 'carelessness' on the part of the subjects:
It appears that this results frona morecareless readingon
the part ofthesubjects offering; an interpretationonly at
the end (p. 27).
However,viewed in terms ofthe inference strategies of
Judgmental Inference theory, it is possible to interpret
Rumelhart's data as further evidence for the hypothesized strategy
paths. Whentext is presentedtoszibjects a lineat a time, with
inferences about each li.ne requirect, subjectsare forced toact like
Perseverers. Even if no inferences were elicited after each line.
Other demand characteristics of the; task virtually force the subject
to interpret the test in a particular' manner. Forexample, ifthe
text is presenteda si.cgle line.ata tume,visualcueswhich would
allow the subjects to recognize thai, there ismore text availaole
which might guide inferences wool li be lost. When.subjects have
all the text prele.at.Mi .at it;.;, i.'.' to intarpet text 'ujiag
their usual strategy paths. T'nus, i r.e greater variability of
interpetation is anartifact ofthese different strategy paths, nota
result of careless reading.
4.1 Experimental Validation of Hypothesis
Experiments arebeingconducted todiscover whether theinference
strategiesexist,whatcharacteristics shouldbeascrioed tothem,
and whether individuals tend to useonlyoneofthe inference
paths. In general, our experimental methodology is similar to that
whichSeifert, et. al. (1982) usedin their experiments onpragmatic
inferences. Ourexperiments, liketheirs,utilize themethods of
false recognition ofmaterial not found inthetest, timing subjects'
reading speed, and inquiring about the subjects' inferences only
after a fulltest is read. The main differencewasthat Seifert. et.
al.,used testsof17 lines each. They reasoned thatitwas possible
that when readers were presented with onlytwo linesoftext,their
inference strategies may bedifferent than when reading a longer
text; i.e., they mayseeit asonly astoryfragment, whereas a longer
text looks like a full story.
The storiesused inourexperimentare not as long. However, we
havecontrolled forthe possible'isolation effect ofshorttexts. "The
control stories usedin thisexperimentvaried inlength:some ofthe
stories were as short as the diagnostic stories, while some were
several lines longer. Ifthere isa difference inprocessing found
between the long andshort control stories, thenit isLikely that the
'isolationeffect' is taking placeinsubjects analysesofthe
experimental texts. These techniques should make our
experimental resultsexternallyvalid.
4.2 Materials
Ten story sets, each consisting ofone story andbetween sixand
nine questions, are presented toeach subject asasingle trial, zacn
storydescri'oed a fairly stereotypical situation found :n iit'iraC-re
and the media. There were two kinds ofquestions w oe a.-.s'vereu.
Thefirsttype ofquestion required thesubject toprovide either
information givenin thestoryoran inference aboutthe sit'uation
described in the story. Thesecond typeofquestion requiredthe
subject to make a truthjudgment about the information inthe
question, which was eitherabout information from thestoiyor
about inferences that couldbe made about events in the story.
Each trial had five control and five experimental story sets.
Control stories were written to virtually forceone" shape of
interpretation about thestory situation; theywere worded so that
inferences would be made at the same points by everyone.
Experimental, ordiagnostic^ stories were worded so that different
shapes ofinterpretations are possible, andso that inferences need
not be made at the samepointsbyall readers, depending uponhow
the reader processes thestory. Usually, the diagnostic stories
allowed two nearly opposite shapesofinterpretation. Also, the
sentence order ofexperimental stories would permit
rearrangement withthesameshapes ofinterpetation possible,
whereas the control stories' sentences could not be rearranged
without destroying their sense.
Fourversionsofeachdiagnosticstory were Used. Some versions
were permutations ofsentence order, asexplained above. Others
had additional information which forced the shape of
interpretation, butstillallowed inferences tobe made at different
places inthetext byreadersusingdifferent. Because some
interpretation shapesmay tendtobemore common than others, or
interpretation shapes may beapplied ina particular order, the
different versions oflhe diagnostic stories had default inferences
corresponding to several of the interpretation shapes. . nuj.
differences in subjects' InterpreUtions could be accountea ror by
different processing methods, rather than particular interpretatioa
shaoe biase.s. Only o.oe ve.'-sion of each story appear"'! in a tr.-o
four trials -A ith the diiTerent versions were constr'sata .1
Inaddition to the different versions ofthastory, there were three
methodsofpresentation. Astory was either presented in its
entirety or one sentence atatime, to test Rumelhart sresults,
discussed above. Asterisks <*) were inthetestatinference points
andat theend ofevery sentence. However, when the stories were
presented asentence atatime, the me^ofpresentationwas
either with asterisks atinference points and atthe ends of
sentences, or only atthe ends ofsentences. Thus, there were three
methods ofpresentation possible ofthe four versions ofthe story
sets, for a total oftwelvetrials.
A3 Procedure
Subjects were run individually. The subjects read instructions
from an Apple II microcomputer, which informed them that they
would take areading comprehension tesrt. The subjects were told to
read thestories for comprehension ratherthan speed. They were to
press the return key as soon as they read past an asterisk, either in
the textor after aquestion. Subjects were instructied that allquestions were to be answered; responses such as Idon tknow ,or
"the story didn't say" were prohibited. Subjects were encouraged u)
answer with their best guess ifthey weren't sure ofthe correct
response. Itwas suggested that the subject think of the stories as
"situations", rather than respond with the actual text ofthe story.
No taskintervened between astory andthe questions. Reading
time was recorded ateach asterisk, which were placed atinference
points, ends ofsentences, and ends ofquestions. One question in
each story set could be (randomly) re-presented, following the
statement "That's a good ans^ver, butthere isabetter one. Can you
think ofitr. Both answers to these querdons would be recorded, as
' well as theorder mwhich thequestions were presented. Asubject
could be requestionsd from zero to five times, the number chosen
randomly. Each subjectwasgiven as much timeasnecessary to
' complete the trial.
4.4 Results
Notall thedata for thisexperiment havebeen collected yet.
However, preliminary results indicate thatthe Recency and
Perseverer strategy paths do exist. The theorized characteristicsof
both groups are also seem to be supported. In particular, Recencies
leave loose endswhennogoalor planis stated, andmake
inferencesconsistentwith the default inferenceofthe latest text,
asevidenced so farbyreading times andquestion-answering data.
Furthermore, Perseverers make initial inferences about goals and
plans, and cling to the initial inferences whenever feasible. Italso
appears thateach individual tends to fhvor asingle inference
strategy.
When text is presented to subjects asingle line atatime, the final
interpretations tend to be more uniform than when the testis
presented all atonce. Though itisstill unknown ifthis effect isa
significant one, this confirms Rumelhart's (1981) findings, and is
consistent with the theory that withoutcues abouttext length,
subjects areforced to actasPerseverers. This isevidence that
strategy paths can be chosen by readers, and hence thatdifferent
choices ofinference pathsare notduesimplytoindividual
differences, but are the result ofdistinct strategies.
5.0 Conclusion: Future Work
The experiments described here were only designed to confirm thatthestrateg;.'paths e.tist by demonstrating thatreaders using the
different strategies have diiierentreadingandunderstanding
behavior, most notably, completely difTererit interpretations of
particuJa.'texts. However, these experiments did notcareiully
exolcTtf 'I'.c i" r'j ..-^s -Jiich riiiii'a r.u .1 .,')vern
inference decisions. Other experiments are currently being
desi'^ ned to test hyootnesesabout the nature ol these rules.
We have constructed a prototype for a computer progra.mwrurn
models thePerseverer andRecency inference strategies,called
STRATEGIST, described inGranger, Eiselt.dc Holbrook (1983).
STRATEGIST was based on thedatawe have collected from the
experiments discussed in this paper. We intend to extend the
STRATEGIST model and use itasa test-bed for hypotheses about
strategy-driven inference rules, as weU as exploring the role of the
inference strategies with textsofdifferentgenres.
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